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Shared values of Singapore: sexual minority rights as
Singaporean value
Phil C.W. Chan
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Singapore
For scholars of comparative constitutional law and human rights, Singapore offers an
exceptional platform in terms of the number and diversity of issues that require and excite
discussions. A human rights issue less discussed is the legal situation affecting persons
belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore, where consensual sexual activity between
male adults continues to be a crime. The Singapore government opposes sexual minority
rights development on the basis of a Singapore ‘culture’ that revolves around certain
‘shared values’. Persons belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore must therefore
overcome a formidable hurdle in order to realise their right of equality, and the legal
situation affecting them provides useful insight into the development of human rights and
governance in Singapore in general. This paper first examines the Singapore government’s
position on human rights by deconstructing Singapore ‘culture’. It then deconstructs the
relevant laws affecting persons belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore and, finally,
explores whether and how Singapore may develop its own jurisprudence on sexual
minority rights under the framework of legitimate constitutional comparativism.
Keywords: Singapore; shared values; homosexuality; sexual minority rights; human
rights; governance; constitutional comparativism
Introduction
For scholars of comparative constitutional law and human rights, Singapore offers an
exceptional platform in terms of the number and diversity of issues that require and excite
discussions. A former British colony and high-income country with a gross national income
by purchasing power parity of US$48,520 per capita for 2007 (ninth in the world and
second in Asia after oil-exporting Brunei Darussalam),1 Singapore has a population of
3,642,700 who hold Singapore citizenship or permanent residency (and another 1,196,700
who hold neither), of which 74.7% are ethnic Chinese, 13.6% ethnic Malays, 8.9% ethnic
Indians, and 2.8% ‘Others’.2 Reflecting Singapore’s historical lineage with Malaysia, the
Constitution of Singapore stipulates Malay as the national language3 while English remains
the medium of official communications.4 The Constitution also provides for the special
position of Malays as ‘the indigenous people of Singapore’5 and for the special regulation
of Islam.6 Singapore’s economic success and multiracial character7 are, however, not the
characteristics for which the country is most famed. The penal law of Singapore, including
its reversal of the burden of proof and, in many cases, imposition of mandatory death
penalty for drug8 and weapon offences9 and mandatory caning for a large number of offences
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ranging from gang robbery10 to unauthorised affixing of a poster on a public wall (on second
conviction);11 the various government policies that discriminate against women; and restric-
tions on freedom of expression including through initiations of defamation proceedings by
the government or by a number of senior politicians in their personal capacity against
opposition parties and foreign newspapers have been subjects of criticism by local rights
groups, foreign governments, and international and non-governmental rights bodies.12
A human rights issue less discussed, however, is the legal situation affecting persons
belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore, where consensual sexual activity between
male adults continues to be a crime.13 While calls for decriminalisation have been made,
the government has argued that the ‘shared values’ (also known as ‘Asian values’, particu-
larly in transnational discourse) of Singapore that emphasise Confucian notions of respon-
sibilities over rights require a communitarian approach towards human rights and preclude
the libertarian approach that the government has argued is suitable (if ever) only in Western
countries. Persons belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore must therefore overcome a
formidable hurdle in order to realise their right of equality, and the legal situation affecting
them provides useful insight into the development of human rights and governance in
Singapore in general. As Baden Offord has observed, ‘any kind of sexuality which does
not conform to the dominant ideological orientation is silenced and made invisible . . .
the issue of homosexuality is an issue that foregrounds the whole dilemma of citizenship,
identity and control in Singapore’.14
In this paper, I argue that while human rights ought indeed to be developed fromwithin, the
juridical insights and experiences other jurisdictions have garnered provide useful resources
for Singapore courts – and Parliament of Singapore – to examine whether and how sexual
minority rights, and human rights in general, may be developed in Singapore as Singaporean
rights and a Singaporean value. As Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na` im discerns, ‘the possibilities
of cultural reinterpretation and reconstruction through internal cultural discourse and cross-
cultural dialogue, as a means to enhancing the universal legitimacy of human rights’, ought
to be explored.15 I am mindful that this task is pregnant with political, social and emotional
factors and I am after all a foreigner in Singapore – albeit from a place (i.e. Hong Kong)
with which Singapore shares the greatest historical, economic, social, cultural and juristic
affinities;16 one where homosexuality was decriminalised by legislature in 199117 and the
differentiation in the ages of consent for different-sex and male/male sexual activity declared
by the judiciary to be unconstitutional in 2005;18 one where, as in Singapore, recourse to
‘Asian values’ alongside Confucian ethics and religious concepts (with predominant if not
exclusive focus on Christian concepts) continues to pervade debates on sexual minority
rights;19 and thus one against which the prevailing situation in Singapore may be tested.
Much encouraged by Professor Thio Li-ann’s call for an honest debate20 on Singapore’s
continued criminalisation of consensual male/male sexual activity notwithstanding her
staunch opposition as a Nominated Member of Parliament21 to decriminalisation,22 this
paper first examines the Singapore government’s position on human rights by deconstructing
the ‘shared values’ and ‘culture’ of Singapore that the government has proclaimed. It then
deconstructs the relevant laws affecting persons belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore
and, finally, explores whether and how Singapore may develop its own jurisprudence on
sexual minority rights under the framework of legitimate constitutional comparativism.
Shared values of Singapore: a critique of the Singapore School on human rights
In putting forward a ‘culture’ in order to override fundamental rights and freedoms, the state
must first define what that culture is, in order to discern whether such a culture in fact exists.
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Sally Engle Merry has explained convincingly that culture must not be seen as static, rigid,
and isolated within a polity: ‘Its boundaries are fluid, meanings are contested, and meaning
is produced by institutional arrangements and political economy. Culture is marked
by hybridity and creolization rather than uniformity or consistency.’23 Furthermore, as
An-Na`im reminds us, in the construction of culture, ‘powerful individuals and groups
tend to monopolize the interpretation of cultural norms and manipulate them to their own
advantage’.24 One must, in addition, explore whether and why that culture should have
such controlling normative force capable of overriding fundamental rights and freedoms.
A colony of the United Kingdom since 1819, Singapore achieved self-government in
1959 and joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, from which it was expelled in 1965
due to conflicts arising from the Kuala Lumpur government’s insistence on affirmative
action for Malays and Singapore’s substantial Chinese population.25 While Singapore
has upon independence retained Westminster-style unicameral parliamentary government
and the common law legal system, it is essentially a dominant-party state with the
People’s Action Party (PAP) dominating all aspects of governance.26
With an all-encompassing survivalist mentality constructed on the basis of Singapore’s
small size and population juxtaposed against its large and populous neighbours, its lack of
natural resources and its multiracial character, the Singapore government has adopted an
authoritarian approach to governance.27 Singapore has not acceded to major international
human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights28
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights29 that would
oblige Singapore to follow internationally agreed human rights norms and subject itself to
international monitoring mechanisms,30 while Singapore courts, as will be seen, have
maintained that when interpreting the Singapore Constitution and statutes and developing
Singapore common law, they should look within the ‘four walls’ of the Constitution
where legal developments in other jurisdictions have little value. The Constitution contains
eight clauses on fundamental liberties, guaranteeing the liberty of the person,31 prohibiting
slavery and forced labour,32 protecting against retrospective criminal laws and double
jeopardy,33 and guaranteeing freedom of movement,34 freedoms of speech, assembly, and
association,35 freedom of religion,36 rights in respect of education,37 and the right of
equality38 under which discrimination ‘on the ground only of religion, race, descent or
place of birth’ is specifically prohibited save otherwise expressly permitted by the Consti-
tution.39 Notwithstanding the normatively binding Universal Declaration of Human
Rights40 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by consensus by
171 States including Singapore at the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human
Rights where it was recognised that ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interde-
pendent and interrelated’,41 the Singapore government has staunchly argued that not all
human rights are universal nor are the modes of implementation of those human rights that
(the Singapore government regards) are: instead, human rights are subject to the historical,
political, economic, social and cultural particularities of each State. The ‘Singapore School’
on human rights was epitomised in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, in
which all Asian governments except those of Japan and the Philippines42 stated that ‘while
human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic
and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing inmind the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’.43
In critiquing the Singapore School on human rights, it is important that the school of
thought is not dismissed a priori simply because it disagrees with the universality
of human rights proclaimed in various international human rights treaties and resolutions,
particularly as the suppression or denial of many of the human rights to which every human
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being should normatively be entitled is perpetuated by the very fact that they are not
explicitly guaranteed by international human rights treaties, or domestic human rights legis-
lation, that purport to protect human rights.44 It is essential, thus, to explore the Singapore
School on human rights from within.
Singapore, Simon Tay notes, ‘has no mythic, pre-colonial civilization on which to base
a unique Asian identity’45 and ‘[i]f the nation is an imagined community . . . the basis of the
Singaporean imagination of nationhood must depend on things other than a deep connec-
tion with the territory or the people’s ancient and common ancestry.’46 Tham Seong Chee
stresses that ‘[v]alues shaped merely by existential circumstances or [that] are the emana-
tions of a struggle for survival to be effective in the long term need to be validated and
rationalized by recourse to a shared historical–cultural past both real and imagined.’47
Tham finds that Singapore’s survivalist mentality ‘entails two interrelated parameters:
one the institutionalization of a value-system that maintains national unity and promotes
common purpose and the other the institutionalization of a value-system that motivates
economic attainment’.48 Thus, the Singapore government has been determined to construct
and inculcate a Singapore ‘culture’ within the populace. Here, it is useful to take note of
Annette Marfording’s observation that, contrary to Adamantia Pollis’ finding of a distinc-
tive Japanese culture in which democracy and fundamental rights are formally enshrined
while asserting or advocating them is socially disfavoured,49 the Japanese’s aversion to
rights assertion and advocacy has been the result not of an indigenous culture but of long-
standing state indoctrination, through education and institutional barriers, of dogmas
adopted from Western countries with the aim of preserving the status quo.50 Marfording
argues that in deconstructing a particular process of enculturation, one must not overlook
the role of government policies, not in the autonomous determination of cultural values,
but in the imposition of a cultural ideology that is not indigenous to the populace.
The Singapore government’s pursuit of a cultural ideology and its desire to inculcate that
cultural ideology in Singaporeans could not have been made more explicit as Singapore
President Wee Kim Wee stated in his parliamentary opening address in January 1989 –
which formed the basis of the subsequent ‘shared values’ consultation and discourse in
Singapore – the importance of which warrants detailed quotation:
Singapore is wide open to external influences. Millions of foreign visitors pass through each
year. Books, magazines, tapes, and television programmes pour into Singapore every day.
Most are from the developed countries of the West. The overwhelming bulk is in English.
Because of universal English education, a new generation of Singaporeans absorbs their con-
tents immediately, without translation or filtering.
This openness has made us a cosmopolitan people, and put us in close touch with new ideas
and technologies from abroad. But it has also exposed us to alien lifestyles and values. Under
this pressure, in less than a generation, attitudes and outlooks of Singaporeans, especially
younger Singaporeans, have shifted. Traditional Asian ideas of morality, duty and society
which have sustained and guided us in the past are giving way to a more Westernised, indivi-
dualistic, and self-centred outlook on life.
Not all foreign ideas and values are harmful. We cannot shut out the outside world, and turn
inwards on ourselves. As Singapore develops, we must adapt our customs and traditions to suit
new circumstances.
However, the speed and extent of the changes to Singapore society is worrying. We cannot
tell what dangers lie ahead, as we rapidly grow more Westernised.
What sort of society will we become in another generation? What sort of people do we want
our children to become? Do we really want to abandon our own cultures and national identity?
Can we build a nation of Singaporeans, in Southeast Asia, on the basis of values and concepts
native to other peoples, living in other environments? How we answer these questions will
determine our future.
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If we are not to lose our bearings, we should preserve the cultural heritage of each of our
communities, and uphold certain common values which capture the essence of being a Singa-
porean. These core values include placing society above self, upholding the family as the basic
building block of society, resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention, and
stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony.
We need to enshrine these fundamental ideas in a National Ideology. Such a formal statement
will bond us together as Singaporeans, with our own distinct identity and destiny. We need to
inculcate this National Ideology in all Singaporeans, especially the young. We will do so
through moral education and by promoting the use of the mother tongue, by strengthening
the teaching of values in schools, and through the mass media, especially the newspapers
and television.51
However, the nature of history is that it cannot be erased or treated as if non-existent or
alterable. It is an irreversible fact that Singapore was colonised by the United Kingdom for
140 years and colonial enculturation, epitomised by Singapore’s post-colonial retention of
Westminster-style parliamentary government and predominant use of English in official
communications, has coloured and is part and parcel of Singapore culture and, conse-
quently, of any Singaporean national ideology. It is not tenable to argue that Singapore
culture consists only of Confucian ethics (whether or not in conjunction with Islamic,
Hindu, and Christian beliefs and values), just as contemporary Chinese culture is not
solely guided by Confucian, communist, or socialist-market teachings. As will be seen,
those who oppose sexual minority rights in Singapore have justified their position
through a myriad of arguments based on self-selected and self-interpreted ‘Asian values’,
Confucian ethics, and Western/Christian religious concepts. As Hussin Mutalib observes
in relation to the formation of Singapore national identity:
Identity-formation is often fluid and ever-changing, and there is a strong overlap between past
historical experiences of a people and their present socio-political circumstances. Different
ethno-religious groups in a country may also relate to the state with varying intensities;
so too individuals within particular ethnic groups, given their socio-economic status and
friendships with out-groups, may exhibit different degrees of attachment to the country
from their own ethnic groups.52
I have argued elsewhere that opposition to sexual minority rights in Hong Kong has
stemmed from such cultural schizophrenia that the Hong Kong government has been
unable to put forward a coherent argument as to why sexual minority rights are incompa-
tible with Hong Kong ‘culture’, as it sought to justify laws against gay men that had been
adopted during British colonial times and continues to stonewall sexual minority rights
development through recourse to self-selected and self-interpreted ‘Asian values’,
Confucian ethics, and religious (exclusively Christian) concepts.53 En passant, to argue
that Christianity, with its presence in all parts of the world, is now a religion transcending
all national cultures and is no longer a purely Western religion is a fallacious attempt to
disguise the ultimate foundation of the religion in Europe (inclusive of Jerusalem and
Constantinople). The argument also discredits the central thesis of the Singapore School
that human rights are a concept that emanates from Western countries and, for that
reason alone, are essentially inapplicable in Singapore.
Furthermore, as Beng-Huat Chua has pointed out, the Singapore government’s endea-
vours to construct and inculcate a Singapore culture around Confucian ethics have taken
place only since the 1980s; until then ‘rugged individualism’ had been encouraged in
Singapore.54 Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime Minister and now Minister Mentor of
Singapore, once remarked to an audience in the United States in 1967 that ‘I am no
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more a Chinese than President Kennedy was an Irishman.’55 Neil Englehart has observed
that venues where Confucian traditions could have been fostered, such as traditional
Chinese schools, ‘were systematically destroyed by the [People’s Action Party] in the
1970s, ostensibly because they were hotbeds of communism. This reflected a change in
educational policy designed to encourage Chinese Singaporeans to become fluent in
English. It was thought at the time that this would help attract international capital to
Singapore. This policy also had the convenient effect of removing a set of institutions
that might have been used to organize an opposition to the PAP among their core
Chinese constituency.’56 Englehart notes that ‘[b]y the time the PAP decided to launch
the Confucian Ethics campaign in the 1980s, the Chinese schools, which could have
promoted a Confucian revival among Chinese Singaporeans, had been eliminated. The
government, therefore, was free to construct a Confucian campaign from the ground up.’57
The Confucian Ethics campaign was nevertheless unsuccessful. Despite the dispropor-
tionate resources allocated to Confucian Ethics vis-a`-vis the other four religions58 from
which secondary school students could choose for the compulsory Religious Knowledge
course,59 only 17.8% of students enrolled in Confucian Ethics as opposed to 44.4% in
Buddhist Studies and 21.4% in Bible Knowledge.60 It is also telling that the curriculum
design for Confucian Ethics was assisted by eight American and Taiwanese scholars on
Confucianism61 because, the Singapore Ministry of Education explained, ‘Confucian
ethics was a field which we were not familiar with and . . . we wanted to insure that the
right approach was used to teach the subject.’62 With the Confucian Ethics campaign
receiving little fanfare even among Chinese Singaporeans, the Religious Knowledge pro-
gramme was abandoned in 1990.63 Englehart notes that the Confucian Ethics campaign
failed because ‘minority groups perceived it as an attempt to impose Chinese culture on
them, while Chinese Singaporeans themselves resisted. Chinese women in particular saw
the campaign as an attempt to subjugate them with an archaic and patriarchal code of
conduct, while the English-educated Chinese class whose development the PAP had
encouraged in the 1970s noticed the authoritarian political implications of the campaign.’64
The government then launched the ‘shared values’ consultation in 1991 in order to
placate the unease of ethnic and religious minority groups. In the White Paper on Shared
Values, which Benedict Sheehy argues enjoys quasi-constitutional status in Singapore,65
the government stated that ‘[a] major difference between Asian and Western values is
the balance each strikes between the individual and the community. The difference is not
so stark as black and white, but one of degree. On the whole, Asian societies emphasise
the interests of the community, while Western societies stress the rights of the individual.’66
It concluded that five core values should guide Singapore society: ‘nation before the com-
munity and society above self’, ‘family as the basic unit of society’, ‘regard and community
support for the individual’, ‘consensus instead of contention’, and ‘racial and religious
harmony’.67 While the government expressly stated in the White Paper that the five core
values were shared by all ethnic and religious groups in Singapore and did not simply
revolve around Confucian ethics which ‘cannot be so shared’,68 Confucian ethics as
selected and interpreted by the government permeated the White Paper (while Islamic
and Hindu beliefs and values bore scant attention), as the government stated that
‘[m]any Confucian ideals are relevant to Singapore’69 and ‘the Chinese community can
draw upon Confucian concepts which form part of their heritage, to elaborate the abstract
Shared Values into concrete examples and vivid stories’.70 In particular, the government
referred to the Confucian principle of governance by honourable men ( junzi) to whom
the people, for the sake of good society, entrust the ultimate decision-making capacity.71
The government also laid emphasis on the ‘sanctity of the family unit’,72 which it found
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to be universal across cultures73 and ‘the fundamental building block out of which larger
social structures can be stably constructed’.74 Yet, family was defined again only in Con-
fucian terms, however ‘modified’:75
Traditional Confucian family relationships are strictly hierarchical. Sons owe an absolute duty
of filial piety and unquestioning obedience to fathers. Males take precedence over females,
brothers over sisters, and the first born over younger sons. But in Singapore, the parent–
child relationship is more one of respect rather than absolute subordination. Sons and daughters
are increasingly treated equally. The relationship between older and younger siblings is less
authoritarian. In all these aspects Singaporean practices must continue, without eroding cohe-
sion and loyalty within the family unit.76
The fact that the notion of family in Singapore remains stratified in terms of age and gender
and the imposition of the Confucian notion of family upon Singapore’s multiracial society
are best exemplified by the enactment of the Maintenance of Parents Act in 1995 – which
enables any person ‘domiciled and resident in Singapore who is of or above 60 years of age
and who is unable to maintain himself adequately’ to apply to the Tribunal for the Main-
tenance of Parents so created by the legislation for an order that his children maintain
him financially77 – and by a myriad of family and educational policies that discriminate
against women.78
It is important to observe that the Confucian notion of family, in conjunction with the
Confucian notion of junzi, assists in complementing and facilitating authoritarian rule in
Singapore, as its central precept, filial piety, provides and constitutes the framework
against which authority in all generalities is to be understood and observed, and the
Chinese, including Chinese Singaporeans, have always regarded the family as a micro-
scopic state. Thus, when deconstructing Singapore ‘culture’, the ‘shared values’ of
Singapore, and the Singapore School on human rights, one should take note of Thio’s
caution thus:
the danger arises when government-articulated collective interests in the name of culture and
community become synonymous with state interests. Society and state become conflated.
Where this manoeuvre is accomplished, any criticism of government immediately becomes cri-
ticism subversive of the state and, thereby, the community’s interests. We must be wary when
the government (which controls the apparatus of the artificial entity known as the ‘state’)
purports to speak on behalf of the entire community because, even in formal democracies,
the interests of minority groups or other sectors of a heterogeneous society may not be perfectly
represented in legislative bodies.79
As Pollis has argued generally, ‘[b]y controlling the state structures, and often ignoring
the gap between themselves and those over whom they rule, the elites set national goals
while simultaneously claiming to represent their societies’ cultural values.’80 While Thio
agrees with Pollis that ‘the crucial question’81 is ‘whether modern states adhere to the
values that they claim inhere in their cultures, or whether the modern state, with its capacity
to repress, exploits the language of cultural relativism to justify and rationalize its own repres-
sive actions in the government elites’ drive to consolidate or to hold on to political power’,82
there are at least three equally, if not more, fundamental questions that ought to be explored:
Does adherence to one’s proclaimed values ipso facto justify repressive actions by the state?
Are adherence to one’s proclaimed values and state repression mutually exclusive? Should,
and if so why should, the state at all adhere to its proclaimed values?
This paper will now deconstruct the relevant laws affecting persons belonging to sexual
minorities in Singapore with a view to discerning whether the proclaimed values of Singapore
The International Journal of Human Rights 285
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in relation to homosexuality and sexual minority rights development are indeed Singaporean
values and, if they are, whether and why they should or should not be adhered to. In the
process of exploration, it must be borne in mind that no matter one’s position on sexual
minority rights in Singapore, in order for his or her position to be valid, one must not
simply dismiss a priori and must understand and critically assess the alleged incompatibility
between sexual minority rights and Singapore culture. For the same reason, one must also
explore and explain whether and how sexual minority rights may in fact and in law be
developed under the Singapore Constitution as Singaporean rights and a Singaporean value.
Deconstructing laws affecting persons belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore
Clare Hemmings has observed that ‘[f]or national spokesmen for a range of African and
Asian nation-states, among others, homosexuality is . . . framed as a betrayal in two ways:
as a failure of appropriate gendered and sexual citizenship, and as a marker of Western
influence. By suturing nation to heterosexuality through positing “gayness . . . as a polluting
foreign influence”, state representatives can deny any history of same-sex practice in the
national context at stake, and dismiss global sexual rights movements as straightforwardly
imperialistic.’83 As one of the foremost Confucian filial obligations is to continue the ances-
tral (male) line, the inability of a person to procreate with another person who is of the same
sex, together with the purported exclusivity of biological naturalness in penile–vaginal inter-
course,84 renders the homosexual, as it is generally portrayed, to be thus a role that only a
‘specialized, despised, and punished’85 soul would be willing to assume. Amid depictions
of homosexuality as a Western-oriented ‘choice’,86 historical evidence that homosexuality
permeated imperial China87 is either entirely ignored or, on the rare occasions that it is
acknowledged, simply dismissed as ‘wild’.88 However, the fact remains that the criminalisa-
tion of consensual male/male sexual activity in Singapore was implanted as part of British
colonial rule and is not indigenous to Singapore society. As Kenneth Paul Tan has observed:
In colonial Bugis Street, the ah qua89 was sexually exploited as an object of the illicit desires of
tourists and foreign (mostly Caucasian) troops in Singapore. This sexually deviant subject –
consumed for pleasure, then ‘ridiculed, condemned, and made a spectacle of’ – was the
grotesque embodiment of the languor and effeminacy associated with the colonized Asian
native. As an expression of the complexities of colonial power, the ah qua was more than
just the exaggerated eroticized subject of colonial desire. Under British colonial administration,
homosexuality was (and today continues to be) against the law. The ah qua, a highly visible and
sexualized Asian native, represented the anarchic and destructive tendencies of erotic energies
that civilization – in the historic form of colonial domination – needed . . . to repress in the
name of progress. Laws against the ah qua were laws against (the seductiveness of) moral
degeneracy and the ruination of civilization, and therefore served as a broader justification
for colonial practices.90
Corresponding to section 61 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 in the United
Kingdom,91 section 377 of the Penal Code of Singapore stated that ‘[w]hoever voluntarily
has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animals, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
10 years, and shall also be liable to fine.’92 While section 377 has since been repealed and
replaced, section 377A of the Penal Code of Singapore, corresponding to section 11 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 in the United Kingdom93 (since repealed),94 continues
to prescribe that ‘[a]ny male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the com-
mission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any
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act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to 2 years.’95 Consent is immaterial to a section 377A prosecu-
tion.96 In his Singapore High Court decision in Ng Huat v. Public Prosecutor,97 an
appeal against conviction and sentence arising from a prosecution for gross indecency
under section 377A – which I argue should have been initiated for assault outraging the
modesty of the person under section 354 of the Penal Code as the male victim had not
provided informed consent to and had at least once explicitly refused the examination by
the appellate radiographer, who was married with two children,98 of his penis and buttocks
for his wrist injury99 – Chief Justice Yong Pung How stated that ‘[w]hat amounts to a
grossly indecent act must depend on whether in the circumstances, and the customs and
morals of our times, it would be considered grossly indecent by any right-thinking
member of the public.’100 The Chief Justice acknowledged per curiam that prosecution
could be laid under section 377A against a person who had been a victim of male/male
sexual assault, but nevertheless did ‘not see any real cause for concern’:101
My sympathies lie with those perfectly respectable gentlemen who may well be innocent
‘victims’ of a grossly indecent act. It is true that they may find themselves named within the
charge as persons ‘with’ whom the offence of gross indecency has been committed. Neverthe-
less, I do not see any real cause for concern. If they did have any homosexual tendencies, they
would almost invariably have been charged with the offence as well. The very fact that they are
not similarly charged can only attest to their innocence of the act. No aspersions are being cast
on their sexual proclivities. Technically, of course, as consent is not an element of the s 377A
offence, they could also be charged with the offence, but I am confident that the judicious exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion will prevail to ensure that such travesties of justice do not occur.
There will be no distress or embarrassment, much less any injustice, as long as the law is under-
stood and enforced on a clear and unambiguous basis.102
The possibility that a person with or without any homosexual tendencies may have been
placed under duress or simply forced into committing gross indecency was not explored.103
Thus, from Ng Huat, if the Chief Justice’s reasoning is to be understood literally, it would
appear that any personwith any homosexual tendencieswould be denied the attribute of inno-
cence and ascribed the attribute of guilt in a transaction of gross indecency under section
377A. The circumstances in Ng Huat were particularly telling: if the victim had had
or had been suspected of having any homosexual tendencies (information on which was
not provided in the case report), he might well have found himself prosecuted for gross
indecency. As Philip Rumney and Oliver Phillips demonstrate, such attributes of guilt and
innocence have serious repercussions for all male victims, including gay male victims, of
sexual assault104 and for human agency and rights development generally.105
While the sexual minority rights debate in Singapore now largely focuses on section
377A, the Singapore government should also consider amending section 354, which prohi-
bits ‘assault or use of criminal force to a person with intent to outrage modesty’106 and
which Meredith Weiss finds to have been commonly used in cases of police entrapment
of gay men,107 insofar as it penalises consensual male/male sexual activity as assault.108
Lastly, note should be taken of section 19 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order
and Nuisance) Act, which prohibits solicitation in a public place whether with or without
physical contact.109 Not unlike in the United Kingdom, consensual female/female sexual
activity has never been explicitly criminalised in Singapore.110
Those who oppose sexual minority rights in Singapore do not regard it inherently
contradictory to premise their arguments on laws implanted by the United Kingdom
during colonial times, self-selected and self-interpreted ‘Asian values’, Confucian ethics,
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and religious, particularly Christian, concepts simultaneously. Indeed, Weiss has argued
that ‘Singapore’s homophobic opposition is now (somewhat perversely) global rather
than local: the shrillest condemnation has been not from, for example, Confucian scholars,
but from evangelical Christians – and evangelical Christianity is a relatively recent and
marginal Western import.’111 In response to then Prime Minister and now Senior Minister
Goh Chok Tong’s interview in June 2003 with the Timemagazine in which he stated that the
Singapore civil service had adopted a policy of employing gay men and lesbians so long as
they disclosed their sexual orientation,112 the National Council of Churches of
Singapore, which represents about 150 Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches
in Singapore,113 issued a statement urging the government ‘to maintain: (a) current
legislation concerning homosexuality [which at the time included section 377 of the
Penal Code]; (b) its policy of not permitting the registration of homosexual societies or
clubs; (c) its policy of not allowing the promotion of homosexual lifestyle and activities’,114
Subsequently, in his National Day Rally speech in August 2003, Prime Minister Goh, as he
then was, clarified his position thus:
As for my comments on gays, they do not signal any change in policy that would erode the
moral standards of Singapore, or our family values. In every society, there are gay people.
We should accept those in our midst as fellow human beings, and as fellow Singaporeans.
If the public sector refuses to employ gays, the private sector might also refuse. But gays
too, need to make a living.
That said, let me stress that I do not encourage or endorse a gay lifestyle. Singapore is still a
traditional and conservative Asian society. Gays must know that the more they lobby for public
space, the bigger the backlash they will provoke from the conservative mainstream. Their
public space may then be reduced.
I am glad that conservative Singaporeans and religious leaders have made known their views
on the matter, clearly but responsibly. I hope we will now move on and focus on more urgent
challenges.115
Again, one ought to ask, if Singapore is essentially a Confucian polity, why should the
National Council of Churches of Singapore that represents Anglican, Methodist, and Pres-
byterian churches have such influence on governance in Singapore as was apparently
reflected in Prime Minister Goh’s speech? Also, must a Singaporean be conservative in
order to have his or her view heard and taken note of? What attributes must a Singaporean
have in order to be considered conservative? Are the views of a conservative Singaporean
always correct?
This conjunction, or rather confusion, among ‘Asian values’, Confucian ethics, and
religious/Christian concepts was best epitomised by a parliamentary speech Professor
Thio delivered as a Nominated Member of Parliament in October 2007, in which she
staunchly opposed decriminalising consensual male/male sexual activity in Singapore.
Thio, a leading constitutional law and human rights scholar at the National University of
Singapore whowas educated at Oxford, Harvard, and Cambridge, and a devout Christian,116
made a plethora of arguments against decriminalisation in Singapore which can largely be
found in similar debates in other jurisdictions.117 While she was adamant that Singapore
was a conservative and communitarian polity with its unique Asian family values and
that Singaporeans should debate the issues without foreign or neo-colonial interference or
dogmas, she referred to numerous Western religious and philosophical assertions in her
denunciation of homosexuality and her rejection of the notion that ‘sexual minorities’, a
term that she found to be devoid of legal meaning, have rights for who they are and what
they do in their sexual relations with other persons of the same sex.118 As Emma Henderson
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discerns, ‘[p]arliamentary debates are an important and effective form of social “education”
– an arena in which complicated power relations between social groups lead to explicit
declarations of competing and often contradictory “truth claims” or “ideologies”.’119 This
is particularly the case with Thio’s parliamentary speech, given her capacity as a leading
legal and human rights scholar and as an independent Nominated Member of Parliament
to lay claims to truth and objectivity.120
Sexual minority rights as Singaporean value: the role of constitutional
comparativism
As discussed above, the core argument of the Singapore School on human rights and the
Singapore government’s opposition to sexual minority rights lies in the alleged communi-
tarianism/individualism divide in the modes of governance largely inferred from Singapore
and Western countries. Judicial and legislative decisions that have been reached in Western
countries in support of sexual minority rights, the argument goes, are thus of little value
to Singapore jurisprudentially or normatively.
Not surprisingly, foreign judicial decisions have found lukewarm reception in
Singapore, whose constitutional jurisprudence has prescribed that Singapore courts
should look within the ‘four walls’ of the Singapore Constitution and resulting Singapore
case law when interpreting the Singapore Constitution and statutes and developing
Singapore common law. For example, in Chan Hiang Leng Colin and Others v. Public
Prosecutor,121 the Singapore High Court dismissed the relevance of United States jurispru-
dence on freedom of religion for the sole reason that United States jurisprudence did not
touch upon the local conditions of Singapore: Chief Justice Yong Pung How stated that
‘[t]he social conditions in Singapore are, of course, markedly different from those in the
United States. On this basis alone, I am not influenced by the various views as enunciated
in the American cases cited to me but instead must restrict my analysis of the issues here
with reference to the local context.’122 Interestingly, however, the four walls doctrine in
Singapore constitutional jurisprudence in fact emanated from the Malayan decision in
Government of the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya and
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj,123 where Chief Justice Thomson of the Federation of
Malaya stated that the Malayan Federal Constitution ‘is primarily to be interpreted within
its own four walls and not in the light of analogies drawn from other countries such as
Great Britain, the United States of America or Australia’.124 In turn, the Malayan decision
followed125 the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Adegbenro
v. Akintola126 on appeal from the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria, where Viscount
Radcliffe, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, maintained:
it must be remembered that . . . the British Constitution ‘works by a body of understandings
which no writer can formulate’; whereas the Constitution of Western Nigeria is now contained
in a written instrument in which it has been sought to formulate with precision the powers and
duties of the various agencies that it holds in balance. That instrument now stands in its own
right; and, while it may well be useful on occasions to draw on British practice or doctrine in
interpreting a doubtful phrase whose origin can be traced or to study decisions on the Consti-
tutions of Australia or the United States where federal issues are involved, it is in the end . . .
the wording of the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can
never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions which are not explicitly
incorporated in the formulae that have been chosen as the frame of this Constitution.127
When the Judicial Committee was still the court of last resort for Singapore128 and Hong
Kong129 (among other jurisdictions), it strongly objected to Singapore and Hong Kong
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courts resorting to foreign and international legal materials (save, of course, English legal
materials) in the interpretation of the various individual rights provisions in the Singapore
Constitution and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, respectively. In the Singapore
case of Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,130 Lord Diplock stated:
their Lordships are of opinion that decisions of Indian Courts on Part III of the Indian Consti-
tution should be approached with caution as guides to the interpretation of individual articles in
Part IV of the Singapore Constitution; and that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States on that country’s Bill of Rights, whose phraseology is now nearly two hundred years old,
are of little help in construing provisions of the Constitution of Singapore or other modern
Commonwealth constitutions which follow broadly the Westminster model.131
Caution, however, does not equal outright dismissal. Constitutional comparativism,
provided that it is consistent and principled, has intrinsic values and advantages as a
juridical enterprise and engine for thoughtful judicial, and even legislative, decisions
with carefully discerned insights and experiences from other jurisdictions. By exploring
the constitutional, legal and social developments in other jurisdictions, Singapore courts
as well as Parliament of Singapore may be better informed and better positioned to
discern for Singapore society whether and how an individual right, such as sexual orien-
tation equality, may be developed in Singapore under the Singapore Constitution as a
Singaporean right and a Singaporean value. As Thio argues on the basis of the Federal
Court of Malaysia decision in Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia,132 which
like Government of the State of Kelantan followed the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council decision in Adegbenro v. Akintola, ‘it is permissible “to look at other Constitutions
to learn from their experiences, and from a desire to see how their progress and well-being is
ensured by their fundamental law”, while bearing in mind that “[e]ach country frames its
constitution according to its genius and for the good of its own society”.’133 A flexible
approach supported by coherent reasoning should be adopted such that Singapore courts,
as well as Parliament of Singapore, may make use of juridical insights and experiences
from beyond Singapore’s boundaries. As Lord Diplock in Ong Ah Chuan explained:
In a constitution founded on the Westminster model and particularly in that part of it that
purports to assure to all individual citizens the continued enjoyment of fundamental liberties
or rights, references to ‘law’ in such contexts as ‘in accordance with law’, ‘equality before
the law’, ‘protection of the law’ and the like, in their Lordships’ view, refer to a system of
law which incorporates those fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and
parcel of the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the commencement
of the Constitution. It would have been taken for granted by the makers of the Constitution that
the ‘law’ to which citizens could have recourse for the protection of fundamental liberties
assured to them by the Constitution would be a system of law that did not flout those funda-
mental rules. If it were otherwise it would be misuse of language to speak of law as something
which affords ‘protection’ for the individual in the enjoyment of his fundamental liberties, and
the purported entrenchment (by Article 5) of Articles 9(1) and 12(1) would be little better than a
mockery.134
Conversely, outright dismissal of foreign judicial decisions and juridical discourses does
not at all benefit Singapore’s development of its own jurisprudence and juridical discourse,
which, akin to and as part of Singapore culture, is not static in time or in form. As Thio has
noted, ‘[c]ulture is used “negatively” to repel foreign influences by characterising them as
alien or inappropriate. It is used “positively” as a major lens through which the process
of constitutional adjudication should take place.’135 Thio argues that Singapore courts
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ought to explore the differences between the circumstances of a Singapore case and a foreign
judicial decision that may possibly be relevant, its reasoning and its underlying context and
circumstances, and that ‘perfunctory waiving away of foreign cases on the basis of “we’re
different” is undesirable. A focused elaboration of the different social conditions of these
countries would aid in assessing their relevance to the matter at hand.’136 By participating
in ‘transnational judicial conversations’,137 Singapore courts, I argue, will benefit greatly the
development of Singapore’s own jurisprudence and juridical discourse, and may well
influence foreign courts and their nations to follow suit. As Sujit Choudhry maintains:
In cases of constitutional difference, if the court rejects foreign assumptions and affirms
its own, the value of this exercise has been to heighten its awareness and understanding of
constitutional difference, which in turn will shape and guide constitutional interpretation.
Conversely, in cases of constitutional similarity, if similarity once identified is embraced,
dialogical interpretation grounds the legitimacy of importing comparative jurisprudence and
applying it as law . . . . in cases of constitutional similarity a court may reject shared assumptions
and stake out a new interpretive approach proceeding from radically different premises.138
. . .
Dialogical interpretation probably wins on the dimension of legitimacy, because it makes no
normative claims regarding comparative jurisprudence. It uses comparative case law instru-
mentally, as a means to stimulate constitutional self-reflection. Thus understood, dialogical
interpretation is more a legal technique than a theory of constitutional interpretation. Compara-
tive materials are not asserted to be true or right; rather they reflect a particular way of articu-
lating underlying values and assumptions.139
The quintessence of colonialism and neo-colonialism is where transnational conversa-
tions, within and without courts, are wanting, where values and assumptions are imposed –
or self-imposed – upon a polity. It is not neo-colonialism for an independent country to
consider, for itself and its own good, the merits and demerits of insights and experiences
from other countries, and, as Alison Dundes Renteln has pointed out, ‘relativism in no
way precludes the possibility of cross-cultural universals discovered through empirical
research’.140 Conversely, by deliberately preventing itself from fulfilling its potential as a
valid and equal participant in transnational conversations, Singapore, in the words of
Edward Saı¨d, ‘participates in its own Orientalizing’.141
Lastly, one must not forget that our world consists of more than Singapore, Asian
countries, and Western countries, and that, notwithstanding the convenience of ‘Asian
values’ arguments, Asian countries share much more dissimilarity than similarity
inter se – religiously, politically, economically, socially, culturally, and jurisprudentially.142
Singaporeans need look no further than to their Malay neighbours (both in Malaysia and in
Singapore) to find that they may share more similarity with many citizens of Western
countries.143 As Ame´lie Oksenberg Rorty discerns:
Sometimes there is unexpectedly subtle and refined communication across radically different
cultures . . . . sometimes there is insurmountable bafflement and systematic misunderstanding
between relatively close cultures. For the most part, however, we live in the interesting inter-
mediate grey area of partial success and partial failure of interpretation and communication.
The grey area is to be found at home among neighbors as well as abroad among strangers.144
Thus, mindful of the Singapore School on human rights, I suggest that, in relation to
sexual minority rights, Singapore may consider taking note of the legal developments
in two non-Western jurisdictions – Hong Kong145 and South Africa146 – where sexual
orientation equality has achieved constitutional and judicial recognition and protection.
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The Singapore Constitution states unequivocally that ‘[a]ll persons are equal before the
law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.’147 Through the Singapore Constitution
as an ‘enabling tool’,148 Singapore courts, Thio has observed, have agreed that ‘rights
should be construed in a purposive, generous manner to avoid what Lord Wilberforce
termed “the austerity of tabulated legalism” and so as to ensure that individuals receive
the “full measure” of fundamental liberties’,149 and it ought to be borne in mind, as
Justice Karthigesu in his Singapore High Court decision in Taw Cheng Kong v. Public
Prosecutor150 stated, that ‘[c]onstitutional rights are enjoyed because they are constitutional
in nature. They are enjoyed as fundamental liberties – not stick and carrot privileges. To
the extent that the constitution is supreme, those rights are inalienable.’151 As Seth
Kreimer argues, ‘the most constructive use of comparative constitutional law is not as an
alternative store of constitutional software, but a challenge to us to reexamine the resources
in our own system’.152 It is to be remembered that the four walls doctrine ‘does not
require an exclusive reliance on domestic legal sources’,153 and the four walls of Singapore
constitutional jurisprudence are expandable and renovatable so that individuals within them
may have more room for better and more fulfilling lives. Equally, communitarianism does
not at all mean that all voices outside the community’s boundaries must be dismissed a
priori; otherwise, the community is not a community of morality, but a perpetual prison
of one’s soul.
Conclusion
At the heart of the ‘shared values’ discourse within Singapore and the ‘Asian values’ debate
transnationally, the fundamental question Singaporeans ought to ask is what kind of society
they want their country to be, in relation not just to sexual minority rights, but to all aspects
of governance. In this self-exploration, foreigners, be they foreign academics, foreign
courts, foreign governments, or international human rights bodies (with the need for
state ratification of particular human rights treaties and continuing state co-operation, and
these bodies’ general lack of enforcement powers), have a very limited role other than to
offer insights and experiences that they have themselves discerned and endured. It is of
course true that every country is different and that those countries whose legislatures
and/or judiciaries have reached decisions in support of sexual minority rights have their
own continual dilemmas regarding the oppression and protection of sexual minorities,
and it would be presumptuous and silly for anyone to think that they are utopias for
sexual minorities. The meaning of deciding one’s own destiny perforce embodies one’s
decision to follow a particular, or to refuse to follow anyone else’s, path, be it good or
bad, but to dismiss insights and experiences garnered in other countries in the course of
their own struggles merely because those insights and experiences were assembled by
foreigners about their own foreign countries deprives oneself of valuable opportunities to
engage with other life perspectives, however disagreeable, such that one’s own life perspec-
tives may be better understood and enhanced. As Thio maintains, in the interpretation of the
Singapore Constitution and statutes and the development of individual rights in Singapore,
‘the mere citing of “local conditions” as a basis for rejecting foreign jurisdiction cases is
not enough – these local conditions must be articulated and elaborated upon so that their
“localness” or applicability or cogency may be open for assessment’.154 Indeed, Victor
Ramraj argues that the spirit of transnational conversations inhered in the White Paper
on Shared Values, ‘the stated aim of which is “to evolve and anchor a Singaporean
identity”, to the extent that it seeks to find common values in varied cultural traditions –
a project which ostensibly has identified a considerable intersection of values.’155
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To live a life the modes and meanings of which are dictated by someone else, however
convenient or affluent such a life, is to forgo a true and meaningful life in which one’s own
thoughts and actions have autonomous meanings. Nor is such a model of governance
wise, as it deprives the country of true and meaningful participation and input by its
citizenry – the underlying purpose of education rooted in both Confucianism and the
Western Enlightenment. It therefore falls upon Singaporeans, and Singaporeans alone,
to decide whether and how they should uphold the Confucian ideal to advise the govern-
ment, gently but dutifully, by meaningfully asking themselves, and their government,
what path, or paths, they wish for their country and their society, and it neither is
selfish nor undermines the ‘shared values’ of Singapore for Singaporeans to meaningfully
ask themselves, and their government, what path, or paths, they wish for themselves and
their future generations.156 This paper, thus, cannot be better concluded than by adopting
Thio’s words of wisdom in full:
I speak, at the risk of being burned at the stake by militant activists. But if we don’t stand for
something, we will fall for anything. I was raised to believe in speaking out for what is right,
good and true, no matter the cost. It is important in life not only to have a Brain, but a Spine.
One of my favourite speeches by PM Lee [Hsien Loong], which I force my students to read,
is his Harvard Club speech 2 years ago where he urged citizens not to be ‘passive bystanders’ in
their own fate but to debate issues with reason and conviction. I took this to heart. To forge
good policy, we need to do our homework and engage in honest debate on the issues. Let us
also speak with civility, which cannot be legislated, but draws deep from our character and
upbringing. Before government can govern man, man must be able to govern himself.
Sir, let speaking in the public square with reason, passion, honesty, civility, even grace, be
the mark of a Citizen of Singapore.157
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field of arts and letters, culture, the sciences, business, industry, the professions, social or com-
munity service or the labour movement; and in making any nomination, the Special Select
Committee shall have regard to the need for nominated Members to reflect as wide a range
of independent and non-partisan views as possible.’ For a discussion of the evolution and
structure of Singapore’s parliamentary system, see Thio Li-ann, ‘The Post-Colonial Consti-
tutional Evolution of the Singapore Legislature: A Case Study’, Singapore Journal of Legal
Studies (1993): 80.
22. See full transcript of Thio Li-ann’s speech to Parliament of Singapore as a Nominated
Member of Parliament during Singapore’s Parliamentary Debates on Penal Code Revi-
sions, 22–3 October 2007, http://www.straitstimes.com/STI/STIMEDIA/pdf/20071023/
ThioLeeAnn.pdf (accessed 21 October 2008).
23. Sally Engle Merry, ‘Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (and Anthropology
along the Way)’, Political and Legal Anthropology Review 26, no. 1 (2003): 55, 67. See also
Neil A. Englehart, ‘Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: The Rise and Fall
of Confucian Ethics in Singapore’, Human Rights Quarterly 22, no. 2 (2000): 548; Ann-
Belinda S. Preis, ‘Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique’,
Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1996): 286.
24. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, ‘Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International
Standards of Human Rights’, in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for
Consensus, ed. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1992), 19, 27–8.
25. For a history of Malaysia and Singapore, see N.J. Ryan, A History of Malaysia and Singapore,
5th edn (Kuala Lumpur and London: Oxford University Press, 1976).
26. See, e.g., Thio, ‘Post-Colonial Constitutional Evolution’; Thio Li-ann, ‘The Right to Political
Participation in Singapore: Tailor-Making a Westminster-Modelled Constitution to Fit the
Imperatives of “Asian” Democracy’, Singapore Journal of International and Comparative
Law 6 (2002): 181; Thio Li-ann, ‘“Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication”: A
Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with International Human
Rights Law’, Singapore Year Book of International Law 8 (2004): 41; Thio Li-ann, ‘Taking
Rights Seriously? Human Rights Law in Singapore’, in Human Rights in Asia: A Comparative
Legal Study of Twelve Asian Jurisdictions, France and the USA, ed. Randall Peerenboom,
Carole J. Petersen, and Albert H.Y. Chen (London: Routledge, 2006), 158.
27. See Tham Seong Chee, ‘Values and National Development in Singapore’, Asian Journal
of Political Science 3, no. 2 (1995): 1.
28. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UN GA Res. 2200A(XXI)
of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976.
29. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UN GA Res. 2200A(XXI)
of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976.
30. Singapore in 1995 did accede to the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UN GA
Res. 34/180 of 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 1981. For a
discussion of the potential impact of the Convention on governance in Singapore, see Thio
Li-ann, ‘The Impact of Internationalisation on Domestic Governance: Gender Egalitarianism
& the Transformative Potential of CEDAW’, Singapore Journal of International and
Comparative Law 1 (1997): 278.
31. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1999 Rev. Edn, Art. 9.
32. Ibid., Art. 10.
33. Ibid., Art. 11.
34. Ibid., Art. 13.
35. Ibid., Art. 14.
36. Ibid., Art. 15.
37. Ibid., Art. 16.
38. Ibid., Art. 12(1).
39. Ibid., Art. 12(2).
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40. Adopted and proclaimed by UN GA Res. 217A(III) of 10 December 1948. For discussions of
the legal status and ethical significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see,
e.g., Chris Brown, ‘Universal Human Rights: A Critique’, International Journal of Human
Rights 1, no. 2 (1997): 41; Thomas Pogge, ‘The International Significance of Human
Rights’, Journal of Ethics 4, nos 1–2 (2000): 45; Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The
Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, Australian
Year Book of International Law 12 (1992): 82; Louis B. Sohn, ‘The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than States’, American University Law
Review 32, no. 1 (1982): 1.
41. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by acclamation at the United Nations
World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), 32
ILM 1661 (1993), para. 5. For discussions of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, see, e.g., Philip Alston, ‘The UN’s Human Rights Record: From San Francisco to
Vienna and Beyond’, Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1994): 375; Kevin Boyle, ‘Stock-
Taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993’, Political
Studies 43, no. 1 (1995): 79; Christina M. Cerna, ‘Universality of Human Rights and Cultural
Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts’, Human
Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 740; Markus G. Schmidt, ‘What Happened to the “Spirit
of Vienna”? The Follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the
Mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights’, Nordic Journal of International
Law 64, no. 4 (1995): 591.
42. Adamantia Pollis, ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism’, Human Rights
Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1996): 316, 333, n. 43.
43. Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the ministers and representatives of
Asian States meeting at Bangkok from 29 March to 2 April 1993 pursuant to UN GA Res.
46/116 of 17 December 1991 in the context of preparations for the World Conference on
Human Rights, Vienna, para. 8; excerpted in Lynda S. Bell, Andrew Nathan, and Ilan
Peleg, eds, Negotiating Culture and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press,
2001), Appendix B.
44. For a discussion of how international human rights law perpetuates the suppression and denial
of sexual minority rights, see Eric Heinze, ‘Sexual Orientation and International Law: A Study
in the Manufacture of Cross-Cultural “Sensitivity”’, Michigan Journal of International Law
22, no. 2 (2001): 283. Cf. Eric Heinze, Sexual Orientation: A Human Right (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1995).
45. Simon S.C. Tay, ‘Culture, Human Rights and the Singapore Example’, McGill Law Journal
41, no. 4 (1996): 743, 762.
46. Ibid., citing Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
47. Tham, ‘Values and National Development in Singapore’, 6.
48. Ibid., 2.
49. Pollis, ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited’, 332–4.
50. Annette Marfording, ‘Cultural Relativism and the Construction of Culture: An Examination of
Japan’, Human Rights Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1997): 431.
51. As quoted in Government of Singapore, White Paper on Shared Values, Cmd. 1 of 1991
(Singapore: National Printers, 1991), para. 2.
52. Hussin Mutalib, ‘National Identity in Singapore: Old Impediments and New Imperatives’,
Asian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (1995): 28, 29.
53. Chan, ‘Lack of Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Legislation’; Chan, ‘Same-Sex
Marriage/Constitutionalism’; Chan, ‘Stonewalling through Schizophrenia’.
54. Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London:
Routledge, 1995): 23–5.
55. As quoted in Englehart, ‘Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument’, 555.
56. Ibid., 556.
57. Ibid.
58. It ought to be noted, however, that Confucianism is not a religion and is at its core ‘thoroughly
secular’: William K. Gabrenya, Jr, and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, ‘Chinese Social Interaction:
Harmony and Hierarchy on the Good Earth’, in The Handbook of Chinese Psychology,
ed. Michael Harris Bond (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), 309, 310.
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59. Michael Hill, ‘“Asian Values” as Reverse Orientalism: Singapore’, Asia Pacific Viewpoint 41,
no. 2 (2000): 177, 187.
60. Englehart, ‘Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument’, 557.
61. Hill, ‘“Asian Values” as Reverse Orientalism’, 187.
62. As quoted in Englehart, ‘Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument’, 556. Englehart,
ibid., aptly puts it: ‘In other words, the Confucians did not know their Confucius.’
63. Ibid., 557.
64. Ibid., 557–8.
65. Benedict Sheehy, in ‘Singapore, “Shared Values” and Law: Non East versus West Consti-
tutional Hermeneutic’, Hong Kong Law Journal 34, no. 1 (2004): 67, 73, argues that the
White Paper ‘is a quasi-Constitution because it sets out fundamental principles suitable for
organising many aspects of a society such as those found usually in the preamble of a consti-
tution. A constitutional preamble is particularly important because it sets out the governing
hermeneutical principles which are to guide the interpretation of all the constitutional articles
that follow. The importance of this quasi-Constitutional document, the Shared Values, in com-
municating to the Singaporean community and the world at large can be seen in its ubiquity: it
has been integrated into all the Governmental ministries.’
66. White Paper on Shared Values, para. 24.
67. Ibid., para. 52.
68. Ibid., para. 40.
69. Ibid., para. 41.
70. Ibid., para. 40.
71. Ibid., para. 41.
72. Ibid., para. 12.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., para. 43.
76. Ibid., para. 44.
77. Maintenance of Parents Act 1995 (Cap. 167B), 1996 Rev. Edn, s. 3(1). For a discussion of the
legislation, see Wing-Cheong Chan, ‘The Duty to Support an Aged Parent in Singapore’,
Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 13, no. 3 (2004): 547.
78. Gender equality, like sexual orientation equality, is not expressly enshrined in the Singapore
Constitution, and women in Singapore suffer discrimination in many facets of their lives
directly or indirectly as a result of a myriad of government policies: see, e.g., Michelle
M. Lazar, ‘For the Good of the Nation: “Strategic Egalitarianism” in the Singapore
Context’, Nations and Nationalism 7, no. 1 (2001): 59; William Keng Mun Lee, ‘Gender
Inequality and Discrimination in Singapore’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 28, no. 4
(1998): 484; Lenore Lyons, ‘The Limits of Feminist Political Intervention in Singapore’,
Journal of Contemporary Asia 30, no. 1 (2000): 67; Lenore Lyons, ‘A Politics of Accommo-
dation: Women and the People’s Action Party in Singapore’, International Feminist Journal of
Politics 7, no. 2 (2005): 233; Lenore Lyons, ‘A Curious Space “in-between”: The Public/
Private Divide and Gender-Based Activism in Singapore’, Gender, Technology and Develop-
ment 11, no. 1 (2007): 27; Eugene K.B. Tan, ‘A Union of Gender Equality and Pragmatic
Patriarchy: International Marriages and Citizenship Laws in Singapore’, Citizenship Studies
12, no. 1 (2008): 73; Teo You Yenn, ‘Inequality for the Greater Good: Gendered State Rule
in Singapore’, Critical Asian Studies 39, no. 3 (2007): 423; Thio, ‘Impact of Internationalisa-
tion on Domestic Governance’; Thio Li-ann, ‘Recent Constitutional Developments: Of
Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs’,
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2002): 328.
79. Thio Li-ann, ‘An “i” for an “I”? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional
Adjudication’, Hong Kong Law Journal 27, no. 2 (1997): 152, 155.
80. Pollis, ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited’, 329.
81. Thio, ‘An “i” for an “I”’, 156.
82. Pollis, ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited’, 320.
83. Clare Hemmings, ‘What’s in a Name? Bisexuality, Transnational Sexuality Studies and
Western Colonial Legacies’, International Journal of Human Rights 11, nos 1–2 (2007):
13, 16, quoting Peter A. Jackson, ‘Pre-Gay, Post-Queer: Thai Perspectives on Proliferating
Gender/Sex Diversity in Asia’, Journal of Homosexuality 40, nos 3–4 (2001): 1, 8.
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84. It is one of many arguments Thio proffered in her opposition to decriminalising consensual
male/male sexual activity in Singapore: see full transcript of Thio’s speech to Parliament of
Singapore (note 22 above). However, it appears that her argument had been pre-empted by
the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in Public Prosecutor v. Kwan Kwong Weng [1997]
1 SLR 697, where the definition of ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ in
section 377 of the Penal Code 1871 (Cap. 224), since repealed and replaced, in the context
of fellatio between a man and a woman was in issue. While following the Indian decision
in Lohana Vasantal Devehand and Others v. State [1968] Cr LJ 1277, where it was stated,
ibid., 1279–80, that ‘it could be said without any hesitation that the orifice of mouth is not,
according to nature, meant for sexual or carnal intercourse. Viewing from this aspect it
could be said that the act of putting a male organ in the mouth of a victim for the purposes
of satisfying his sexual appetite, would be an act of carnal intercourse against the order of
nature’ (as quoted in Kwan Kwong Weng, 703), Justice Karthigesu managed nonetheless to
make an allowance for ‘foreplay’ prior to consensual sexual intercourse between a man and
a woman. In His Honour’s opinion: ‘As between a man and a woman and from a biological
point of view, that being the only sensible point of view to take, sexual intercourse in the
order of nature is the coitus of the male and female sexual organs. Whether that coitus is
for the purposes of procreation or not in our view is quite immaterial. Any other form of
sexual intercourse would, it must follow, be carnal and against the order of nature. We use
the word “carnal” in the sense that it is lustful . . . So, prima facie, fellatio between a man
and a woman would be carnal intercourse against the order of nature. However, it is a fact
of life, in humans as well as in animals, that before the act of copulation takes place there
is foreplay to stimulate the sex urge. . . . when couples engaged in consensual sexual inter-
course willingly indulge in fellatio and cunnilingus as a stimulant to their respective sexual
urges, neither act can be considered to be against the order of nature and punishable under s
377 of the Penal Code. In every other instance the act of fellatio between a man and a
woman will be carnal intercourse against the order of nature and punishable under s 377’
(ibid., 705). I argue that from a biological point of view male/male anal intercourse or fellatio
is no more unnatural than fellatio or cunnilingus engaged in between a man and a woman.
85. Mary McIntosh, ‘The Homosexual Role’, in Queer Theory/Sociology, ed. Steven Seidman
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 33, 35.
86. It is another argument Thio proffered in her opposition to decriminalising consensual male/
male sexual activity in Singapore: see full transcript of Thio’s speech to Parliament of
Singapore (note 22 above). However, as I have argued elsewhere in relation to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification
and accession by UN GA Res. 44/25 of 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2
September 1990, and sexual minority identity, opponents of sexual minority rights fail or do
not regard it necessary to explain the logical corollary that if homosexuality is a choice, then
so is heterosexuality, and ‘heterosexuals who flaunt their heterosexuality while at the same
time enthusiastically dismissing sexual minority adolescents’ (and individuals’) sexual orien-
tations by alleging that sexual orientation is merely a choice may ask themselves when they
chose to become heterosexuals and remind themselves that if such a choice was ever made,
their chosen heterosexuality is perforce susceptible to intense volatility. Not surprisingly, this
is a foremost reason why those who seek to repress other people’s sexual orientations have
first to repress their very own’: Phil C.W. Chan, ‘No, it is not just a phase: an adolescent’s
right to sexual minority identity under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child’, International Journal of Human Rights 10, no. 2 (2006): 161, 170. Judge Posner of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, writing extra-judicially, has also
pointed out that ‘[g]iven the personal and social disadvantages to which homosexuality
subjects a person in our society, the idea that millions of young men and women have
chosen it or will choose it in the same fashion in which they might choose a career or a
place to live or a political party or even a religious faith seems preposterous’: Richard
A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 296–7.
Indeed, according to Thio, one of her two ‘homosexual’ friends – both of whom were
Americans and her use of the term ‘homosexual’ was deliberate to signify ‘a degree of
choice’ in homosexuality – ‘never came out and struggles with it’: Thio’s interview with Li
Xueying, ‘A Fiery NMP Gets her Baptism of Fire’, The Straits Times, 2 November 2007,
Insight, 30, http://law.nus.edu.sg/news/archive/2007/ST021107.pdf (accessed 2 November
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2008). If homosexuality were a choice, why, one may ask, was Thio’s friend struggling? The
other ‘homosexual’ friend of Thio’s was equally telling, as according to Thio he had ‘“left” the
community’ (presumably the sexual minority community, or homosexuality): Thio’s interview
with Li Xueying, ‘A Fiery NMP Gets her Baptism of Fire’. If one can so easily ‘leave’ homo-
sexuality, why had Thio’s friend who was struggling not done likewise? Her friend’s ‘leaving’
homosexuality also attests to my argument in ‘No, it is not just a phase’ that if homosexuality is
merely a choice that can be discarded, then heterosexuality is an equally volatile choice equally
discardable.
87. See Fang-fu Ruan, ‘China’, in Sociolegal Control of Homosexuality: A Multi-Nation Compari-
son, ed. Donald J. West and Richard Green (New York: Plenum Press, 1997): 57; Matthew
Harvey Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2000).
88. Quoted from full transcript of Thio’s speech to Parliament of Singapore (note 22 above).
89. According to Russell Heng Hiang Khng, ‘Tiptoe out of the Closet: The Before and After of the
Increasingly Visible Gay Community in Singapore’, Journal of Homosexuality 40, nos 3–4
(2001): 81, 81, ah qua is ‘a Chinese Fujian dialect term particular to Singapore – which
became a widely used pejorative term for all gay men’.
90. Tan with Lee, ‘Imagining the Gay Community in Singapore’, 185, quoting Laurence Wai-Teng
Leong, ‘Singapore’, in Sociolegal Control of Homosexuality: A Multi-Nation Comparison, ed.
Donald J. West and Richard Green (New York: Plenum Press, 1997), 127, 134. See also
Heinze, ‘Sexual Orientation and International Law’, 283, 307, where it is argued generally
that ‘[t]he notion of minority sexual orientation as “un-African” or “un-Asian” is the embodi-
ment of European-style racism, for it does exactly what Europeans were accused of doing:
it ignores the histories of thousands of different African and Asian peoples, throughout
thousands of years of history, each with their own changing patterns of social and sexual
norms. It perpetuates the distinctly colonial idea that Africans or Asians are all alike, that
their pre-colonial existence was frozen in time’ (emphasis in original).
91. The provision substituted the death penalty mandated by the 1533 Buggery Act (25 Henr. VIII
c. 6) with life imprisonment as the maximum sentence for consensual male/male anal inter-
course in the United Kingdom, and has since been repealed: Sexual Offences Act 2003
(c. 42), s. 140 and Sch. 7. According to H. Montgomery Hyde, The Other Love: An Historical
and Contemporary Survey of Homosexuality in Britain (London: Heinemann, 1970), 40, the
Buggery Act was repealed in 1553 by Queen Mary I (1 Mar. c. 1), who was Roman Catholic
and restored the powers of ecclesiastical courts which the Buggery Act had removed (indeed
the removal was the primary reason for the statute, as Henry VIII severed England from the
ultimate authority and jurisdiction of the papacy in order to divorce Catherine of Aragon
and marry Anne Boleyn), but was reinstated in 1563 by Queen Elizabeth I (5 Eliz. I c. 17),
who was Protestant.
92. Penal Code 1871 (Cap. 224), s. 377 (since repealed and replaced); as quoted in Lynette J. Chua
Kher Shing, ‘Saying No: Sections 377 and 377A of the Penal Code’, Singapore Journal of
Legal Studies (2003): 209, 214. Section 377 of the Penal Code 1871 (Cap. 224), 2008 Rev.
Edn, in its current form concerns and prohibits sexual penetration of a corpse.
93. Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (c. 69), s. 11.
94. Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42), s. 140 and Sch. 7.
95. Penal Code 1871 (Cap. 224), 2008 Rev. Edn, s. 377A.
96. Lim Hock Hin Kelvin v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR 801 (Singapore Court of Appeal).
97. [1995] 2 SLR 783.
98. Ibid., 793.
99. Ibid., 785–6.
100. Ibid., 792.
101. Ibid., 791.
102. Ibid.
103. Interestingly, however, Chief Justice Yong Pung How took into account the possibility that ‘the
appellant will be placed in a precarious position by an extended term of imprisonment within a
confined male environment, bearing in mind the nature of the offence for which he has been
convicted’ among other mitigating factors in his decision to substitute the original sentence
of ten months’ imprisonment imposed by the magistrate with a sentence of three months’
imprisonment: ibid., 794.
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104. Philip N.S. Rumney, ‘Gay Male Rape Victims: Law Enforcement, Social Attitudes and
Barriers to Recognition’, International Journal of Human Rights 13, nos 2–3 (2009): 233.
105. Oliver Phillips, ‘Blackmail in Zimbabwe: Troubling Narratives of Sexuality and Human
Rights’, International Journal of Human Rights 13, nos 2–3 (2009): 345.
106. Section 354(1) of the Penal Code 1871 (Cap. 224), 2008 Rev. Edn, states that ‘[w]hoever
assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely
that he will thereby outrage the modesty of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to 2 years, or with fine, or with caning, or with any combination
of such punishments.’
107. Weiss, ‘Who Sets Social Policy in Metropolis?’, 274.
108. In his Singapore High Court decision in Tan Boon Hock v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR
150, a section 354 prosecution arising from an undercover police operation against gay
men, Chief Justice Yong Pung How substituted on appeal a fine of SG$2000 for the initial
sentence of four months’ imprisonment and three strokes of the cane. Per curiam, the Chief
Justice found that ‘[i]t is disquieting that an accused arrested as a result of a police operation
(where, as far as the homosexual accused could discern, there would appear to be little question
of consent being forthcoming from the other man who then turned out to be a police officer in
disguise) should be charged with . . . the offence of outraging another’s modesty’: ibid., 150.
The Chief Justice, however, did not examine the issue as the defendant had pleaded guilty and
appealed only his sentence (although it ought to be noted here that the court had the inherent
jurisdiction to examine the issue proprio motu).
109. Section 19 of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 (Cap. 184),
1997 Rev. Edn, states that ‘[e]very person who in any public road or public place persistently
loiters or solicits for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose shall be
guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $1,000 and, in
the case of a second or subsequent conviction, to a fine not exceeding $2,000 or to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to both’.
110. Nicholas Bamforth, in Sexuality, Morals and Justice: A Theory of Lesbian and Gay Rights Law
(London: Cassell, 1997), 25, explains that ‘[t]he reasons for the UK’s gender-specific approach
remain ambiguous, but are probably connected with the fact that when the relevant provisions
were drafted, public acknowledgement of female sexuality would have been unthinkable in
English society. Sexual acts between men were unmentionable in polite company, but their
existence was at least recognized at the level of public policy, although they were perceived
as the product of sinfulness or mental illness rather than a stable sexual orientation; they
were therefore legislated against and punished, albeit under oblique names such as “gross
indecency”. Sexual acts between women were simply ignored.’
111. Weiss, ‘Who Sets Social Policy in Metropolis?’, 285. Weiss notes, ibid., n. 128, that 10.1% of
Singapore’s population self-identified as Christian in the 1980 census, 12.7% in 1990, and
14.6% in 2000, and argues that Christian opposition has particular potency in the sexual min-
ority rights debate in Singapore as Christianity is the fastest-growing religion in Singapore
besides Buddhism and, as Robbie B.H. Goh observes, the religion ‘most strongly associated
with the indices of socioeconomic progress and upwardly mobile class status’ (‘Deus Ex
Machina: Evangelical Sites, Urbanism, and the Construction of Social Identities’, in Postcolo-
nial Urbanism: Southeast Asian Cities and Global Processes, ed. Ryan Bishop, John Phillips,
and Wei Wei Yeo (New York: Routledge, 2003), 305, 307–8). I argue that the general corre-
lation between adoption of Christianity as one’s religion and higher socio-economic status in
Singapore accords Christians who oppose sexual minority rights in Singapore credibility in the
Confucian sense of junzi as the only persons wise enough to form an opinion then taken as
perforce authoritative.
112. See Simon Elegant, ‘The Lion in Winter’, Time, 30 June 2003, http://www.time.com/time/
asia/covers/501030707/sea_singapore.html (accessed 2 November 2008).
113. Tan with Lee, ‘Imagining the Gay Community in Singapore’, 196.
114. National Council of Churches of Singapore, ‘Statement on Homosexuality’, 29 July 2003,
para. 5, http://www.nccs.org.sg/statement.html (accessed 2 November 2008).
115. Quoted from Goh Chok Tong, ‘From the Valley to the Highlands’, National Day Rally speech,
17 August 2003, http://www.gov.sg/nd/ND03.htm (accessed 2 November 2008).
116. In her interview with Li Xueying of the The Straits Times (‘A Fiery NMP Gets her Baptism of
Fire’), Thio related that she converted from a ‘very, very arrogant’ atheist to a devout Christian
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after she attended a Christian Union talk in October 1987 at the University of Oxford where
she was a law student. She recounted that as she was about to leave the talk early she was
‘stopped’ by a voice and ‘basically had a sense that God was talking to me’. According to
the interview, Thio studied Bible Knowledge for her O-level Religious Knowledge course,
in which she scored an A1. I argue that Thio is an example of the failure of the government’s
Confucian Ethics campaign and its construction of Singapore ‘culture’ as essentially
Confucian, and of the central role of some Christians in the opposition to homosexuality
and sexual minority rights in Singapore and the inconsistency of the opposition which
makes use of self-selected and self-interpreted ‘Asian values’, Confucian ethics, and religious,
particularly Christian, concepts simultaneously.
117. For discussions of similar arguments raised in the context of Hong Kong, see Chan, ‘Gay Age
of Consent’; Chan, ‘Lack of Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Legislation’; Chan,
‘Same-Sex Marriage/Constitutionalism’; Chan, ‘Stonewalling through Schizophrenia’; Chan,
‘Male/Male Sex in Hong Kong’.
118. Although Thio’s arguments against decriminalising consensual male/male sexual activity in
Singapore can largely be found in similar debates in other jurisdictions, she did raise an argu-
ment that was rather uncommon in sexual minority rights debates and one that was particularly
pertinent to ‘filial’ Singapore – namely, the correlation, negative as she alleged, between
‘sexual minority rights’ and women’s rights. According to Thio, ‘[t]o slouch back to Sodom
is to return to the Bad Old Days in ancient Greece or even China where sex was utterly
wild and unrestrained, and homosexuality was considered superior to man–women relations.
Women’s groups should note that where homosexuality was celebrated, women were relegated
to low social roles; when homosexuality was idealized in Greece, women were objects not
partners, who ran homes and bore babies. Back then, whether a man had sex with another
man, woman or child was a matter of indifference, like one’s eating preferences. The only
relevant category was penetrator and penetrated; sex was not seen as interactive intimacy,
but a doing of something to someone. How degrading’: quoted from full transcript of
Thio’s speech to Parliament of Singapore (note 22 above). However, it is generally accepted
that women’s rights and sexual minority rights are substantially and substantively linked
and mutually reinforcing: see, e.g., Davina Cooper, ‘An Engaged State: Sexuality, Govern-
ance, and the Potential for Change’, Journal of Law and Society 20, no. 3 (1993): 257; He
Xiaopei, ‘Chinese Queer (Tongzhi) Women Organizing in the 1990s’, in Chinese Women
Organizing: Cadres, Feminists, Muslims, Queers, ed. Ping-Chun Hsiung, Maria Jaschok,
and Cecilia Milwertz, with Red Chan (Oxford: Berg, 2001): 41; Susie Jolly, ‘“Queering”
Development: Exploring the Links between Same-Sex Sexualities, Gender, and Develop-
ment’, Gender and Development 8, no. 1 (2000): 78; Oliver Phillips, ‘A Brief Introduction
to the Relationship between Sexuality and Rights’,Georgia Journal of International and Com-
parative Law 33, no. 2 (2004): 451; David A.J. Richards,Women, Gays, and the Constitution:
The Grounds for Feminism and Gay Rights in Culture and Law (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1998); Rachel Rosenbloom, ed., Unspoken Rules: Sexual Orientation and
Women’s Human Rights (London and New York: Cassell, 1996). It is therefore very interesting
that Thio, the leading women’s rights legal scholar in Singapore, considered society’s accep-
tance of homosexuality to be a direct and controlling factor in society’s subordination of
women. It is to be recalled that gender equality, like sexual orientation equality, is not expressly
enshrined in the Singapore Constitution, and women in Singapore suffer discrimination in
many facets of their lives directly or indirectly as a result of a myriad of government policies:
see, e.g., Lazar, ‘For the Good of the Nation’; Lee, ‘Gender Inequality and Discrimination
in Singapore’; Lyons, ‘The Limits of Feminist Political Intervention in Singapore’; Lyons,
‘A Politics of Accommodation’; Lyons, ‘A Curious Space “in-between”’; Tan, ‘A Union of
Gender Equality and Pragmatic Patriarchy’; Teo, ‘Inequality for the Greater Good’; Thio,
‘Impact of Internationalisation on Domestic Governance’; Thio, ‘Recent Constitutional
Developments’. Contrary to Thio’s position, I argue that the status of persons belonging to
sexual minorities in Singapore is positively correlated with the status of women in Singapore
and that developing sexual minority rights in Singapore will at the same time enhance women’s
rights and, as importantly, rights consciousness in Singapore, as oppression of women and
oppression of persons belonging to sexual minorities, including lesbian women, have
always come from the same source – the male heterosexual state. As Nancy Kim reminds
us, ‘[t]he label “culture” has obscured the power-play involved in the evolution of “traditional”
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practices that affect women. . . . “culture” is often composed of different “subcultures”
that may or may not conform to the expectations and norms of the broader society. . . . The
culture of which anthropologists speak is the dominant culture within society – the
culture of society’s power elite. Culture, thus distilled, leaves out rebels, misfits, and the dis-
empowered. . . . In almost every society, the power elite is comprised overwhelmingly of men.
Because most cultures are male-dominated, how and what women choose to accept or reject as
part of their culture is often ignored or suppressed’, ‘Toward a Feminist Theory of Human
Rights: Straddling the Fence between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism’,
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25, no. 1 (1993): 49, 88–90. The correlations
between the statuses and oppressions of women and of persons belonging to sexual minorities
in Singapore, and how women and persons belonging to sexual minorities in Singapore may
work together to enhance greater general equality in Singapore, warrant a paper of its own.
En passant, Thio’s correct acknowledgment in her parliamentary speech that homosexuality
was common in China helped discredit the alleged incompatibility between homosexuality
and Confucian ethics as cultural values encompassing all Chinese – traditional Confucian
ethics do not metamorphose into something else at Singapore’s, or any, borders. Also, in
the context of Thio’s argument that sexual minority rights development undermines the
status of women, one must keep in mind that ‘man–women relations’ in Singapore,
Chinese, Christian, Hindu, or Islamic culture – whether Thio’s use of the plural form was
deliberate or inadvertent – used to be polygamous consisting of one man and more than
one woman, and that the celebrated definition of civil marriage in common law – ‘as under-
stood in Christendom . . . the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclu-
sion of others’ – emanated from the English decision inHyde v.Hyde and Woodmansee (1866)
1 LR P & D 130, 133, which concerned not homosexuality but polygamous marriage. Indeed,
the Biblical provision, that ‘Let a woman learn in silence with full submission. I permit no
woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent. For Adam was
formed first, then Eve; and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and
became a transgressor. Yet she will be saved through childbearing, provided they continue
in faith and love and holiness, with modesty’ (1 Timothy 2:11–15), formed the basis for
the centuries-long suppression and disenfranchisement of women in society, which South
African Supreme Court of Appeal Judge Farlam, who is also Chancellor of the Anglican
Church of the Province of Southern Africa, in Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, Case
CCT 232/03, 30 November 2004, para. 121, cited as one reason why same-sex marriage
had not and could not have been recognised in South Africa, since as ‘the principle of legal
equality between the spouses was not enshrined in our law there were many rules forming
part of our law of matrimonial relations which put the husband in a superior position and
the wife in an inferior one. The law could thus not easily accommodate same-sex unions
because, unless the partners thereto agreed as to who was to be the “husband” and who the
“wife”, these rules could not readily be applied to their union.’ It is therefore crucial when
reflecting on human rights or governance issues to keep in mind that ‘[i]f people are not
aware of the historical and contextual nature of human rights and not aware that human
rights become realized only by the struggles of real people experiencing real instances of
domination, then human rights are all too easily used as symbolic legitimizers for instruments
of that very domination’: A. Belden Fields and Wolf-Dieter Narr, ‘Human Rights as a Holistic
Concept’, Human Rights Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1992): 1, 5.
119. Emma Henderson, ‘Of Signifiers and Sodomy: Privacy, Public Morality and Sex in the Decri-
minalisation Debates’, Melbourne University Law Review 20, no. 4 (1995–6): 1023, 1024.
120. As Thio stated in her interview with Li Xueying of The Straits Times (‘A Fiery NMP Gets her
Baptism of Fire’), ‘[t]here was an overwhelming sense of relief that I had said what I had said.
So maybe one of the functions of the NMP is because we are not so much weighted by
considerations of political niceties because we have no constituency. Our constituency is to
our conscience and our truth and our own reputations in putting forth what we hope will be
considered credible arguments.’
121. [1994] 3 SLR 662.
122. Ibid., 681.
123. [1963] MLJ 355.
124. Ibid., 358.
125. Ibid.
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126. [1963] 3 WLR 63.
127. Ibid., 73–4.
128. Appellate recourse to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the court of final resort
for Singapore was first restricted in 1989 when Parliament of Singapore enacted the Judicial
Committee (Amendment) Act 1989 (No. 21 of 1989) whereby an appeal to the Judicial
Committee would thenceforth be allowed only if, in a civil case, all the parties to the proceed-
ings agreed to such an appeal prior to the Singapore Court of Appeal hearing the case or, in a
criminal case, if the proceedings involved the death penalty and the presiding judges of the
Singapore Court of Criminal Appeal, since merged with the Singapore Court of Appeal in
1993 by the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1993 (No. 16 of 1993), could
not come to a unanimous decision. Subsequently, the Constitution of the Republic of Singa-
pore was amended in 1994 and the Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994 (No. 2 of 1994)
enacted to the effect that as of 8 April 1994 all appeals to the Judicial Committee were disal-
lowed and the Singapore Court of Appeal constituted thenceforth the court of final resort for
Singapore. For a discussion of the evolution of the legal system of Singapore, see Kevin Y.L.
Tan, The Singapore Legal System, 2nd edn (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1999).
129. In Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Lee Kwong-kut [1993] 3 HKPLR 72, 100, Lord Woolf
insisted that Hong Kong courts ought to determine the question of inconsistency between a
statutory provision and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383) through literal
examination of the statutory provision alone. A too generous approach to the interpretation
of the Ordinance, His Lordship surmised, would only lead to injustice: ‘While the Hong
Kong judiciary should be zealous in upholding an individual’s rights under the Hong Kong
Bill, it is also necessary to ensure that disputes as to the effect of the Bill are not allowed to
get out of hand. The issues involving the Hong Kong Bill should be approached with
realism and good sense, and kept in proportion. If this is not done the Bill will become a
source of injustice rather than justice and it will be debased in the eyes of the public. In
order to maintain the balance between the individual and the society as a whole, rigid and
inflexible standards should not be imposed on the legislature’s attempts to resolve the difficult
and intransigent problems with which society is faced when seeking to deal with serious crime.
It must be remembered that questions of policy remain primarily the responsibility of the
legislature.’ For a discussion of constitutional comparativism and its implications for rights
development in Hong Kong, see Phil C.W. Chan, ‘Keeping up with (which) Joneses: a critique
of constitutional comparativism in Hong Kong and its implications for rights development’,
International Journal of Human Rights 13, nos 2–3 (2009): 307–28. In line with the transfer
of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China, the Hong Kong Court of
Final Appeal, established by Article 81 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 29 ILM 1519 (1990), adopted by the
Seventh National People’s Congress at its Third Session on 4 April 1990 in pursuance of
the 1984 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, 23 ILM 1366 (1984), and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance
(Cap. 484), replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as of 1 July 1997 as the
court of final resort for Hong Kong. See, however, Article 82 of the Basic Law of Hong
Kong, which states that ‘[t]he power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region, which may as
required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court of Final
Appeal’, and Article 158 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, which states that ‘[t]he power of
interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress shall authorise
the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own, in adju-
dicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the
Region. The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also interpret other
provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudi-
cating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or concerning the relationship between
the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the judgments
on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their final judgments which are
not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee
The International Journal of Human Rights 303
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
in
fo
rm
a 
in
te
rn
al
 u
se
rs
] 
At
: 
10
:3
6 
24
 J
un
e 
20
09
of the National People’s Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the
Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the
Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Commit-
tee. However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected. The Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress shall consult its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region before giving an interpretation of this Law.’ For a discus-
sion of the judicial and political autonomy of Hong Kong, see Phil C.W. Chan, ‘Hong Kong’s
Political Autonomy and its Continuing Struggle for Universal Suffrage’, Singapore Journal of
Legal Studies (2006): 285.
130. [1981] 1 MLJ 64.
131. Ibid., 70.
132. [1977] 2 MLJ 187.
133. Li-ann Thio, ‘Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations:
Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore’,
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 19, no. 2 (2005–6): 428, 431–2, quoting Loh Kooi Choon, 189.
134. Ong Ah Chuan, 71.
135. Thio, ‘An “i” for an “I”’, 177.
136. Ibid., 176.
137. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judi-
cial Discourse’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 2, no. 1 (2004): 91; Christopher
McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on
Constitutional Rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20, no. 4 (2000): 499; Anne-Marie
Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’, Virginia Journal of International Law 40, no. 4 (1999–
2000): 1103; Thio, ‘Beyond the “Four Walls”’.
138. Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation’, Indiana Law Journal 74, no. 3 (1998–9): 819, 858.
139. Ibid., 892.
140. Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘Relativism and the Search for Human Rights’, American Anthropol-
ogist 90, no. 1 (1988): 56, 56.
141. Edward W. Saı¨d, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 325.
142. See Yash Ghai, ‘Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate’, Australian Year Book of
International Law 15 (1994): 1.
143. As Thio has pointed out in ‘Recent Constitutional Developments’, 368, Singapore and
Malaysia, the two most vocal countries asserting the potency, legitimacy and immediacy of
an ‘Asian values’ approach to human rights, share inter se divergent perspectives on the
‘Asian values’ they propound, which ‘demonstrates how this school is not a singular set of
values. An important point of differentiation is that Malaysia advocates the need for a
revived religious public culture. Singapore, in espousing a principle of secularity framing
State–Religion relations when it seceded from Malaysia, where Islam is the official religion
of the Federation, does not.’
144. Ame´lie Oksenberg Rorty, ‘Relativism, Persons, and Practices’, in Relativism: Interpretation
and Confrontation, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1989), 418, 418.
145. Leung T.C. William Roy v. Secretary for Justice [2005] 3 HKLRD 657 (Hong Kong Court of
First Instance); Secretary for Justice v. Leung T.C. William Roy [2006] 4 HKLRD 211 (Hong
Kong Court of Appeal). Article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383),
modelled upon and implementing Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, states that ‘[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimi-
nation on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights shall remain in force in Hong Kong even if the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance is repealed, as Article 39 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong states that ‘[t]he pro-
visions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to
Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong
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residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions shall not contra-
vene the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Article.’ Note should also be taken of
Article 25 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, which states unequivocally that ‘[a]ll Hong Kong
residents shall be equal before the law.’
146. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6
(Constitutional Court of South Africa); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
v. Minister of Home Affairs, 39(4) ILM 798 (2000) (Constitutional Court of South Africa);
Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, Case CCT 232/03, 30 November 2004 (Supreme Court
of Appeal of South Africa);Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, Case CCT 60/04, 1 December
2005 (Constitutional Court of South Africa). The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
as promulgated in 1996 is the first national constitution in the world that expressly protects
against sexual orientation discrimination, Article 9(3) of which states that ‘[t]he state may
not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds,
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.’ Article
9(4) of the Constitution goes on to prohibit unfair discrimination by any person on any of
the grounds specified in Article 9(3) and mandate enactment of national legislation to
prevent or prohibit such unfair discrimination. Article 10 of the Constitution, in the most
unequivocal manner, affirms that ‘[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected.’
147. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1999 Rev. Edn, Art. 12(1).
148. Phillips, ‘A Brief Introduction to the Relationship between Sexuality and Rights’, 453.
149. Thio, ‘Beyond the “Four Walls”’, 438, citing Constitutional Reference, No. 1 of 1995 [1995] 2
SLR 201 (Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Tribunal), and quoting Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fisher [1980] AC 319, 329 (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on appeal from
the Court of Appeal for Bermuda).
150. [1998] 1 SLR 943.
151. Ibid., 965.
152. Seth F. Kreimer, ‘Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of
Constitutional Borrowing’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1, no.
3 (1998–99): 640, 650.
153. Thio, ‘Beyond the “Four Walls”’, 431.
154. Thio, ‘An “i” for an “I”’, 174.
155. Victor V. Ramraj, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore’, Singapore Journal of
International and Comparative Law 6 (2002): 302, 327, quoting White Paper on Shared
Values, para. 1.
156. See Joseph Chan, ‘A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China’,
in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212.
157. Quoted from full transcript of Thio’s speech to Parliament of Singapore (note 22 above).
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